The death of the social?
Re-figuring the territory of government

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Abstract

The social, as a plane of thought and action, has been central to political thought and political programmes since the mid-nineteenth century. This paper argues that, while themes of society and concerns with social cohesion and social justice are still significant in political argument, the social is no longer a key zone, target and objective of strategies of government. The rise of the language of globalization indicates that economic relations are no longer easily understood as organized across a single bounded national economy. Community has become a new spatialization of government: heterogeneous, plural, linking individuals, families and others into contesting cultural assemblies of identities and allegiances. Divisions among the subjects of government are coded in new ways; neither included nor excluded are governed as social citizens. Non-social strategies are deployed for the management of expert authority. Anti-political motifs such as associationism and communitarianism which do not seek to govern through society, are on the rise in political thought. The paper suggests some ways of diagnosing and analysing these novel territorializations of political thought and action.

Keywords: social; citizenship; risk; expertise; governmentality; community; exclusion.

In almost all advanced industrial countries, from Sweden to New Zealand, the old certainties of ‘the welfare state’ are under attack, and welfare systems are undergoing transformation. One sees the privatization of public utilities and welfare functions, the marketization of health services, social insurance and pension schemes, educational reforms to introduce competition between schools and colleges, the introduction of new forms of management into the civil service modelled upon an image of methods in the private sector, new contractual relations between agencies and service providers and between professionals and clients, a new emphasis on the personal responsibilities of individuals, their families and their communities for their own future

Economy and Society Volume 25 Number 3 August 1996: 327–356
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well-being and upon their own obligation to take active steps to secure this. At the level of 'governmentality' — in the sense that the term was used by Foucault: the deliberations, strategies, tactics and devices employed by authorities for making up and acting upon a population and its constituents to ensure good and avert ill — it seems as if we are seeing the emergence of a range of rationalities and techniques that seek to govern without governing society, to govern through regulated choices made by discrete and autonomous actors in the context of their particular commitments to families and communities (Rose 1993b, 1994). Of course, these changes, which are not confined to nations with right-wing regimes, may prove to be ephemeral. None the less, these shifts in policy appear to be paralleled in a shift within knowledge itself. The approaches often unified under the term 'post-modernism', together with a number of more local analyses, suggest that the object 'society', in the sense that began to be accorded to it in the nineteenth century (the sum of the bonds and relations between individuals and events — economic, moral, political — within a more or less bounded territory governed by its own laws) has also begun to lose its self-evidence, and 'sociology', as the field of knowledge which ratified the existence of this territory, is undergoing something of a crisis of identity.

While the destabilization of social theory has often been pioneered by those who think of themselves as progressives, the relation of those on the left to the transformations in the welfare state has been almost entirely negative. This is not surprising, given the intimate relations between socialism, as a rationality for politics, and the proliferation of social devices that made up welfare: the social state, social insurance, social service, the social wage, social protection and the rest. But perhaps we need to interrogate this opposition, in which the forces of progress seem obliged to take the side of the social against the forces of reaction which stand for individualism, competition, the market and the like. To begin such a task, we might usefully start by interrogating the notion of 'the social' itself. Are we witnessing not just a temporary shift in political and theoretical fashions but an event: 'the death of the social'?

Government from 'the social point of view'\textsuperscript{32}

When, over a decade ago, Jean Baudrillard diagnosed 'the end of the social' (Baudrillard 1983), he offered his readers three propositions: That the social has never existed, but has always been a kind of simulation of a social relation that has now undergone a de-simulation, a disintegration of what was, in any event, an imaginary space of reference and play of mirrors; that the social has really existed and now invests everything, has extended from a process of the rational control of residues — vagrants, lunatics, the sick — to a state in which everyone is completely excluded and taken in charge for a project of functional integration sanctified by the social sciences; that the social has existed in the past but has ceased to do so — the sociaity of the contract, of the relation of state to civil society, of the dialectic of the social and the individual has been destroyed by the fragmentations of the
media, information, computer simulation and the rise of the simulacrum. Baudrillard concludes with a tender recollection of ‘the unbelievable naivety of social and socialist thinking, for thus having been able to reify as universal and to elevate as ideal of transparency such a totally ambiguous and contradictory – worse, such a residual or imaginary – worse, such an already abolished in its very simulation “reality”: the social’ (Baudrillard 1983: 86).

This diagnosis undoubtedly catches something significant, despite its characteristically apocalyptic tone and opaque field of reference. It reminds us, if we should need reminding, that ‘the social’ is invented by history and catechized by political passions: we should be wary of embracing it as an inevitable horizon for our thought or standard for our evaluations. Gilles Deleuze, in his introduction to Jacques Donzelot’s *The Policing of Families*, puts the issue in rather more sober terms: ‘Clearly it is not a question of the adjective that qualifies the set of phenomena which sociology deals with: the social refers to a particular sector in which quite diverse problems and special cases can be grouped together, a sector comprising specific institutions and an entire body of qualified personnel’ (Deleuze 1979: ix). ‘The social’, that is to say, does not represent an eternal existential sphere of human sociality. Rather, within a limited geographical and temporal field, it set the terms for the way in which human intellectual, political and moral authorities, in certain places and contexts, thought about and acted upon their collective experience. This novel plane of territorialization existed within, across, in tension with other spatializations: blood and territory; race and religion; town, region and nation. A host of lines of organization and intervention cast across most European nations and in North America over the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth intersected, connected and entangled in this hybrid zone of ‘the social’. Social statistics, then sociology, and all the social sciences, would play their part in stabilizing the social as a domain *sui generis*, whose reality could no longer be ignored. Simultaneously, political forces would now articulate their demand upon the State *in the name of the social*: the nation must be governed in the interests of social protection, social justice, social rights and social solidarity.

By the early decades of the twentieth century, politicians in different national contexts in Europe and North America had been forced to accept that government of at least some aspects of this social domain should be added to the responsibilities of the political apparatus and its officials. One sees a rejection of the totalizing claims of political economy to prescribe and delimit the legitimate means to be used for the government of economic life. Simultaneously, law can no longer be the sole and sufficient legitimate political means for achieving order and security; indeed law itself must answer to the demands of social government. The political rationalities that have played so great a part in our own century – socialism, social democracy, social liberalism – may have differed on many things, but on this they agreed – the nation must be governed, but one must pose the question of how to govern from ‘the social point of view’ (cf. Procacci 1989; for France, see Donzelot 1984; for England see Collini 1979; Clarke 1979). ‘The social’ became a kind
of 'a priori' of political thought: order would have to be social or it would cease to exist.

To speak of 'the death of the social' is undoubtedly misleading. Indeed 'social' policies are increasingly articulated at a supra-national level through international bodies such as the Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development, the World Health Organization, the United Nations and the European Union. But, despite the undoubted persistence of the theme of society and social cohesion in contemporary political argument, 'the social' in the sense in which it has been understood for about a century is none the less undergoing a mutation. The conditions for this mutation, and the correlative emergence and proliferation of 'advanced liberal' programmes of government under a variety of different national political regimes, are heterogeneous and dispersed. Economic arguments have placed in question the idea of a national economy, whose formation in the nineteenth century was a key condition for the delineation of a social territory. Economic relations have come to be understood, not just as trans-national, not in terms of relations among discrete national economies, but as connecting up components of one national population with components of another - economic competition is between cities, between sectors, between specialized markets within economic relations that do not respect national political boundaries. The problem of national economic government is now posed differently: while ruling parties still have to manage national populations with the territorialized political machinery available to them, they no longer conceive of themselves as operating upon a naturally functioning and systemically integrated national population whose 'social' coherence is a condition for its economic security (cf. Hindess 1994b).4

The logics of social government were also problematized in other ways. As Hirschman (1991) has pointed out, there was a proliferation of 'rhetorics of reaction' about the paradoxical dis-welfares of the welfare state - its costs, its burdens, its injustices - which came from different parts of the political spectrum. There were also diverse criticisms of the expert powers installed by welfare states, and the discretionary scope that welfare systems accorded to professionals and bureaucrats (I have discussed these in detail elsewhere: Rose 1993b, 1993c). While these politico-ethical criticisms of social government were heterogeneous, they none the less have a certain 'family resemblance'. In particular, arguments made by libertarians of left and right, progressives, humanists, proponents of civil rights and advocates of empowerment shared a changed specification of the subjects of government. The human beings who were to be governed - men and women, rich and poor - were now conceived as individuals who are to be active in their own government. And their responsibility was no longer to be understood as a relation of obligation between citizen and society enacted and regulated through the mediating party of the State: rather, it was to be a relation of allegiance and responsibility to those one cared about the most and to whom one's destiny was linked. Each subject was now located in a variety of heterogeneous and overlapping
networks of personal concern and investment— for oneself, one’s family, one’s neighbourhood, one’s community, one’s workplace. Central to the ethos of the novel mentalities and strategies of government that I have termed ‘advanced liberal’ is a new relationship between strategies for the government of others and techniques for the government of the self, situated within new relations of mutual obligation: the community.

The birth of the community

Until recently, the apparently ‘a-moral’ language of the market captured most attention in debates over changes in welfare— privatization, competition, financial calculation and so forth. But contemporary political rationalities also think in terms of another language which is just as important, which is highly morally invested and which intersects with markets, contracts and consumption in complex and surprising ways: ‘community’. Consider the contemporary salience of the vocabulary of community care, community homes, community workers, community safety, for example. Consider the emergence of the idea of risk communities— drug abusers, gay men, carriers of particular genes, youth at risk. Consider the prominence of the language of community in debates over multi-culturalism and the problems posed for politicians, psychiatrists, police and others working in conditions of cultural, ethical and religious pluralism. All these seem to signal that ‘the social’ may be giving way to ‘the community’ as a new territory for the administration of individual and collective existence, a new plane or surface upon which micro-moral relations among persons are conceptualized and administered. I do not think this is merely a matter of changing professional jargon: it is indicative of a mutation, rather profound, if still uncertain, in the ways of thinking and acting that used to be conducted in a ‘social’ language. It is this mutation that also seems to lie at the heart of the recent prominence accorded to the language of community in political discourse from all sides of the political spectrum, and in the programmatic statements of political philosophers and advocates of the different versions of communitarianism. These new political languages are embodied in the ways in which a whole series of issues are problematized— made amenable to authoritative action in terms of features of communities and their strengths, cultures, pathologies. They shape the strategies and programmes that address such problems by seeking to act upon the dynamics of communities. They configure the imagined territory upon which these strategies should act— such as community mental health. And they extend to the specification of the subjects of government as individuals who are also, actually or potentially, the subjects of allegiance to a particular set of community values, beliefs and commitments.

We should not seek any single origin or cause of this complex reconfiguration of the territory of government. The social formed as a complex plane of interconnection among diverse minor lines of force, shifts in
knowledge, in devices for charting populations and their vicissitudes, in practices of regulation and the pathways of action and calculation they traced out, contingent problematizations and ethical and political reformulations. Contemporary deployments of community are similarly heterogeneous, complex and mobile resultant of revised ways of representing, problematizing and intervening in a whole number of different arenas. The term community, of course, has long been salient in political thought; it becomes governmental, however, when it is made technical. By the 1960s, community was already being invoked by sociologists as a possible antidote to the loneliness and isolation of the individual generated by ‘mass society’. This idea of community as lost authenticity and common belonging was initially deployed in the social field as part of the language of critique and opposition directed against remote bureaucracy. Community activists were to identify, not with a welfare system that they saw as degrading, policing and controlling, but with those who were the subjects of that system – the inhabitants of the housing estates, projects and ghettos. More or less simultaneously, the language of community was utilized by authorities such as police to comprehend the problems they encountered in dealing with difficult zones – ‘the West Indian community’, the criminal community. Community here is a point of penetration of a kind of ethnographic sociology into the vocabularies and classifications of authorities; reciprocally, sociology itself intensified its investigations of collective life in terms of community and its re-anatomizing of the bonds of culture and the ties of locality that were thought to be essential conditions for its moral order. Within a rather short period, what began as a language of resistance and critique was transformed, no doubt for the best of motives, into an expert discourse and a professional vocation – community is now something to be programmed by Community Development Programmes, developed by Community Development Officers, policed by Community Police, guarded by Community Safety Programmes and rendered knowable by sociologists pursuing ‘community studies’. Communities became zones to be investigated, mapped, classified, documented, interpreted, their vectors explained to enlightened professionals-to-be in countless college courses and to be taken into account in numberless encounters between professionals and their clients, whose individual conduct is now to be made intelligible in terms of the beliefs and values of ‘their community’.

No doubt a whole range of other local shifts in vocabulary in diverse sites contributed to the emergence of community as a valorized alternative, antidote or even cure to the ills that the social had not been able to address — or even to the ills of the social itself. But what began to take shape here was a new way of demarcating a sector for government, a sector whose vectors and forces could be mobilized, enrolled, deployed in novel programmes and techniques which operated through the instrumentalization of personal allegiances and active responsibilities: government through community. It is this sense of community that has come to the fore in recent political arguments (e.g. Etzioni 1993; Grey 1996). Society is to be regenerated, and social justice to be
maximized, through the building of responsible communities, prepared to invest in themselves (Commission on Social Justice 1994). As the current leader of the Labour Party put it, 'the search is on to reinvent community for a modern age, true to core values of fairness, co-operation and responsibility'.

The re-figuring of the territory of government in terms of community has a number of significant features. The first is spatial: a kind of 'de-totalization'. The social, overarching all its stratifications and variations, was imagined as a single space, territorialized across a nation. Correlatively, government 'from the social point of view' posited a single matrix of solidarity, a relation between an organically interconnected society and all the individuals contained therein, given a politico-ethical form in the notion of social citizenship. Today, in contrast, a diversity of 'communities' is thought to, actually or potentially, command our allegiance: moral communities (religious, ecological, feminist . . .), lifestyle communities (defined in terms of tastes, styles of dress and modes of life), communities of commitment (to disability, problems of health, local activism) and so forth. Such communities are construed as localized, heterogeneous, overlapping and multiple. Sometimes they are defined in terms of the geographical co-ordinates of a micro-local. Sometimes they are 'virtual communities' associated in neither 'real' space nor 'real' time but through a network of relays of communication, symbols, images, styles of dress and other devices of identification: the gay community, the disabled community, the Asian community (cf. Barry 1996). Such virtual communities are 'diasporic': they exist only to the extent that their constituents are linked together through identifications constructed in the non-geographic spaces of activist discourses, cultural products and media images. And, while the language of community often locates discrete communities within a larger collectivity – a nation, a society, the planet itself, the nature of this superordinate allegiance is now most frequently posed as a problem. Hence arguments over 'multi-culturalism', the rise of political controversies over the implications of 'pluralism' – of ethnicity, religion, of sexuality, of ability and disability – together with conflicts over the competing and mutually exclusive 'rights' and 'values' of different communities.

A second significant feature of the birth of community is its changed ethical character. The social was an order of collective being and collective responsibilities and obligations. While the policies and programmes of the social accorded individuals personal responsibility for their conduct, this individual responsibility was always traversed by external determinations: the advantages or disadvantages conferred by family background, social class, life history, located within a wider array of social and economic forces such as changes in the labour market, booms, slumps, industrial cycles, the exigencies of urban environments, problems of housing supply. Of course, the extent to which such external determinants could or should mitigate personal responsibility was subject to continual dispute, as was the extent to which they could or should be compensated for in education, in the decisions of the criminal court and so forth. Nevertheless, this configuration of ethical vectors is re-organized under
the sign of community. The subject is addressed as a moral individual with bonds of obligation and responsibilities for conduct that are assembled in a new way — the individual in his or her community is both self-responsible and subject to certain emotional bonds of affinity to a circumscribed ‘network’ of other individuals — unified by family ties, by locality, by moral commitment to environmental protection or animal welfare. Conduct is retrieved from a social order of determination into a new ethical perception of the individualized and autonomized actor, each of whom has unique, localized and specific ties to their particular family and to a particular moral community. Here we can locate the proliferation of debates on moral pluralism, and its diverse interpretations — as a relativistic threat to a necessary social agreement on moral absolutes or as the birth of a new era of enhanced ethical seriousness based upon individually sought and chosen allegiances in a cosmopolitan moral universe.

A third key aspect of the birth of community concerns the role of identification. The practices that assembled the social certainly entailed ‘identification projects’: programmes of mass schooling, of public housing, of public broadcasting, of social insurance and so forth had at their heart an image and a goal of the socially identified citizen, the person who, above all, understood themselves to be a member of a single integrated national society. The vocabulary of community also implicates a psychology of identification; indeed the very condition of possibility for a community to be imagined is its actual or potential existence as a fulcrum of personal identity. Yet these lines of identification are configured differently. Community proposes a relation that appears less ‘remote’, more ‘direct’, one which occurs not in the ‘artificial’ political space of society, but in matrices of affinity that appear more natural. One’s communities are nothing more — or less — than those networks of allegiance with which one identifies existentially, traditionally, emotionally or spontaneously, seemingly beyond and above any calculated assessment of self-interest. Hence, like so many other similar loci of allegiance — class, civil society, ethnicity — arguments about community employ a Janus-faced logic (cf. Hindess 1993). Each assertion of community refers itself to something that already exists and has a claim on us: our common fate as gay men, as women of colour, as people with AIDS, as members of an ethnic group, as residents in a village or a suburb, as people with a disability. Yet our allegiance to each of these particular communities is something that we have to be made aware of, requiring the work of educators, campaigns, activists, manipulators of symbols, narratives and identifications. Within such a style of thought, community exists and is to be achieved, yet the achievement is nothing more than the birth-to-presence of a form of being which pre-exists.

‘Government through community’ involves a variety of strategies for inventing and instrumentalizing these dimensions of allegiance between individuals and communities in the service of projects of regulation, reform or mobilization. We can consider two examples which illustrate the complexity of these new governmental technologies.
My first example is security. Within social rationalities of government, a domain of collective security was envisaged to be maintained by the State on behalf of all citizens, through universal measures ranging from social insurance to the enforcement of the criminal law by a unified and socially funded police force. Today, this social image – and the practices to which it was linked – is displaced by a variety of different ways of imagining security, each of which mobilizes a particular sense of community. One image is of the ‘gated city’ preserving the security of its own residents, of the shopping mall policed by private security guards: that is to say, of a diversity of zones each circumscribing what Clifford Shearing has termed a ‘contractual’ community assuming – or being forced to assume – responsibility for ‘its own’ health, happiness, wealth and security (O’Malley 1992; Shearing 1995). Such patterns of re-configuring urban space can be observed in cities as distant as Sydney and Istanbul. The collective logics of community are here brought into alliance with the individualized ethos of neo-liberal politics: choice, personal responsibility, control over one’s own fate, self-promotion and self-government. In a second image, community is promoted as an antidote to the combined depredations of market forces, remote central government, insensitive local authorities in new programmes for the regeneration of delimited locales – paradigmatically areas of disadvantaged inner cities (Etzioni 1993; Atkinson 1994). Here, new modes of neighbourhood participation, local empowerment and engagement of residents in decisions over their own lives will, it is thought, reanimate self-motivation, self-responsibility and self-reliance in the form of active citizenship within a self-governing community. Government through the activation of individual commitments, energies and choices, through personal morality within a community setting, is counterposed to centralizing, patronizing and disabling social government. Paradoxically, given their apparent ideological differences, these opposed versions of security utilize similar images of the subject as an active and responsible agent in the securing of security for themselves and those to whom they are or should be affiliated. Equally, they envision the space of government in similar ways, no longer territorialized across a national space, but organized in terms of the relations of identification between the person and ‘their community’ – the particular collectivity to which each person is bound by kinship, religion, residence, shared plight or moral affinity. In each case, community is not simply the territory of government, but a means of government: its ties, bonds, forces and affiliations are to be celebrated, encouraged, nurtured, shaped and instrumentalized in the hope of producing consequences that are desirable for all and for each.

My second example concerns the health promotion programmes that have taken shape around HIV and AIDS. Gay communities of allegiance and identification pre-existed the HIV epidemic in the West, constructed most recently through the campaigning activities and lifestyle politics of gay activists. In the UK, Europe and the United States, it was largely in response to the political activism of these communities that national governments
prioritized research and policies for HIV and AIDS (Ballard 1992). As politically funded agencies developed strategies for the government of sexual conduct in the name of health, gay organizations, first on their own, then in alliance with government health promotion campaigns, played a key role in the dissemination of new norms of sexual ethics and codes of sexual conduct to those who were 'at risk'. Not only in the publicity and health promotion materials, but also in the mass of social research into sexual attitudes and practices, identity and identification came to play a key role in the way in which sexual activity was rendered intelligible and in the development of strategies for its regulation – not only those targeted upon 'the gay community', but also those targeted upon other 'at risk groups'. Health promotion strategies were linked into the work of activist and self-help organizations, each strongly committed to the formation and valorization of the identity of its users and their communities. This established new forms of exclusion – for example, of haemophiliacs (cf. Watts 1994). New ways of problematizing the subjects to be governed emerged – for example, the way in which 'men who have sex with men' but who do not identify themselves as gay or bisexual have come to be seen as a major obstacle to current strategies for addressing the spread of HIV and AIDS (Bartos 1994). Government through community, even when it works upon pre-existing bonds of allegiance, transforms them, invests them with new values, affiliates them to expertise and re-configures relations of exclusion. This does not make 'communities' in some sense false. But it should alert us to the work entailed in the construction of community, and the implications of the logics of inclusion and exclusion, of responsibilization and autonomization, that they inescapably entail.

We can thus be governed through our allegiance to particular communities of morality and identity. Many programmes of government now operate upon the presupposition of such communities, even where the allegiances presupposed do not immediately appear to exist. Programmes of urban renewal, for example, imagine the plight of the inner city in terms of the loss of a 'spirit of community' with all the capacities of self-reliance, entrepreneurship and communal pride which such a spirit evokes. They attempt to 'empower' the inhabitants of particular inner-city locales by constituting those who reside in a certain locality as 'a' community, by seeking out 'community groups' who can claim to speak 'in the name of community' and by linking them in new ways into the political apparatus in order to enact programmes which seek to regenerate the economic and human fabric of an area by re-activating in 'the community' these 'natural' virtues which it has temporarily lost. Complementarily, imagined communities, created by the activity of local activists or emerging as the reciprocal, as it were, of such governmental projects, can form the locus of the articulation of demands upon political authorities and resistance to such authorities: the language of community and the identity which is its referent becomes the site of new contestations. Hence community mobilization can be for causes as diverse as the demand for funding for HIV research and services, the blocking of a new road driven through a residential
area, the protesting of racial harassment and opposition to policies for housing within 'our' community those who do not belong – black, mad, disabled or whatever. These contradictions of community establish a new and agonistic territory for the organization of political and ethical conflicts.

This mutation, in which collective relations have been re-figured in such a way as to reduce the salience of 'the social' in favour of 'the community', has been accompanied by mutations along a number of other dimensions. In the remainder of this paper, I want to discuss three of these, which are linked in different ways to the birth of the community. Along the first, one sees a reshaping of strategies for governing economic life, decoupling the relations that previously existed between social welfare and economic strength. Along a second, one sees the subjects of government specified in new ways, in terms of an ethic of activity which establishes new divisions between those who are considered to be competent citizens and those whose are not. Along a third, one sees a reshaping of the relations between expertise and politics, and the emergence of a range of new expert technologies for governing expertise.

A de-socialization of economic government

A new configuration is taking shape for the government of economic life, in which techniques for the maximization of social welfare no longer appear necessary to secure economic well-being in a market constituted largely by private enterprises. As I have already noted, the formation of the notion of a national economy was a key condition for the separation out of a distinct social domain. Classical political economy effected a separation of a domain of 'economic' events with their own laws and processes from a 'moral' domain. Economic events were territorialized within a national space, seen as governed by laws and relations whose scope and limits seemed to map onto the territory of political rule. As they crystallized within nineteenth-century thought, 'economies' were organized within nations, limited by borders, customs and other restrictions on imports and exports, unified through a single supply of money, characterized by a set of functional relations between their components, and these unities were located in a wider space within which they could engage in 'foreign trade' with other national economies. The responsibility of the political authorities for the security of a nation, a state and a people, came to be understood in terms of their capacity to nurture natural economic processes to ensure national economic well-being (see the discussion in Tribe 1978). Further, over the course of the nineteenth century and into the twentieth, the solidity of these national economies was increased by the regular publication of various national indicators of economic performance, and by the gradual tracing out of a plane of 'economic policy', which concerned itself with the proper ways in which the strengths of such an economic system could be enhanced: action on the money supply, on the labour market, together with tariffs and restrictions on imports and so forth,
especially as national wealth came to be understood in terms of competition between discrete economies and their struggle to gain access to sources of cheap raw materials, cheap labour or lucrative markets outside their own territorial bounds.

In the strategies of government that developed over the course of the twentieth century, the domains of the economic and the social were distinguished, but governed according to a principle of joint optimization. Economic activity, in the form of wage labour was given a new set of social responsibilities, seen as a mechanism which would link males into the social order, and which would establish a proper relationship between the familial, the social and the economic orders (Meuret 1981; Miller and Rose 1990; Rose 1990: II; Rose and Miller 1995; Walters 1994). Simultaneously, the privacy of the wage contract was weakened, as politicians came to accept that conditions of labour and pay should be regulated in the name of social peace. The production of a labour market itself became part of the responsibilities of economic government, and a range of interventions into the social would maximize the economic efficacy of the population as a work-force, from vocational guidance and labour exchanges to various methods of maintaining the social habits of labour among the unemployed. Gradually, over the next six decades, new indexes of economic activity were invented that would render the economy amenable to management, and new technologies of macro-economic regulations were brought into being. Through mechanisms of social insurance – unemployment benefit, accident insurance, health and safety legislation and so forth – and through an array of forms of economic government – tax regimes, interest rates and other techniques of ‘demand management’ – the state assumed responsibility for the management of a whole variety of risks – to individuals, to employers, to the state itself – in the name of society.

But the perception of ‘the economy’ which underpinned such endeavours is now undergoing a mutation (Hindess 1994b). ‘An economy’ is no longer so easily imagined as naturally co-extensive with the realm of a nation state, with different ‘national economies’ inhabiting a wider common field in which they traded, competed, exploited one another. Theorists and practitioner alike now construe economic relations as ‘globalized’, and this new spatialization of the economy is coupled with arguments to the effect that flexible economic relations need to be established in particular localities (Reich 1992; Hirst and Thompson 1992; both cited and discussed in Hindess 1994b). Overlaying this ‘dialectic of the global and the local’ are other trans-national spatializations of economic relations, such as the argument that there is a ‘global economy’ of ‘world cities’, in which Birmingham, Sydney, Baltimore, Budapest compete among one another for the economic benefit of company location, conferences, sporting events, tourism (Zukin 1991; Lash and Urry 1994).

Irrespective of the accuracy with which these trends are identified and portrayed, the economic problems of government are being re-thought in terms of a revised image of economic space and the means by which it can be
acted upon. It appears that, while national governments still have to manage a national population, the economic well-being of the nation and of its population can no longer be so easily mapped upon one another and governed according to principles of mutual maximization. Government of the social in the name of the national economy gives way to government of particular zones – regions, towns, sectors, communities – in the interests of economic circuits which flow between regions and across national boundaries. The economic fates of citizens within a national territory are uncoupled from one another, and are now understood and governed as a function of their own particular levels of enterprise, skill, inventiveness and flexibility.

This is coupled with a shift in rationalities and techniques for the government of employment and unemployment. Unemployment is now understood as a phenomenon to be governed – both at the macro-economic level and at the level of the conduct of the unemployed person him or herself – through enhancing the activity of the individual in search of work, and obliging the individual to engage in a constant and active search for employment and for the skills that will provide employment. On the one hand, the general problem of unemployment is re-conceived in terms of the respective competitiveness of different labour forces, understood at least in part in terms of the psychological, dispositional and aspirational capacities of those that make them up. On the other, each individual is solicited as an ally of economic success through ensuring that they invest in the management, presentation, promotion and enhancement of their own economic capital as a capacity of their selves and as a lifelong project (Walters 1994; Dean 1995).

This emphasis upon the individual as an active agent in their own economic governance through the capitalization of their own existence is paralleled in a whole new set of vocabularies and devices for managing individuals within the workplace in terms of the enhancement of their own skills, capacities and entrepreneurship. These attempt an alliance between the desires of the worker or manager for self-enhancement and actualization through work and the perceived need of the enterprise to become flexible, competitive, agile, creative, etc. In labour, too, work is no longer to be construed as a social obligation, or its efficiency to be enhanced through maximizing the social benefits that the labourer finds in the workplace, or its primary role to be one of binding the individual into the collective through the socializing effects of the habit of work. Rather, the workplace itself – for labourers and for managers – is to be an area of self-promotion and the government of work is to be undertaken in terms of the enhancement of the active capacities of the entrepreneurial individual. No doubt, too, one could identify similar logics at work in the attempts to regenerate local economies, especially in urban areas: economic decline is to be halted through a range of devices that will enhance the activity of entrepreneurial individuals with skills and flexibility, and aspirations of self-promotion – exemplified, again, in the UK government's current strategies for urban renewal.

In short, one could suggest that, within those strategies of government that I
have termed 'advanced liberal', one finds the emergence of a new way of conceptualizing and acting upon the relations between the government of economic life and the self-government of the individual: the economy is no longer to be governed in the name of the social, nor is the economy to be the justification for the government of a whole range of other sectors in a social form. The social and the economic are now seen as antagonistic, and the former is to be fragmented in order to transform the moral and psychological obligations of economic citizenship in the direction of active self-advancement. Simultaneously, government of a whole range of previously social apparatuses is to be restructured according to a particular image of the economic— the market. Economic government is to be de-socialized in the name of maximizing the entrepreneurial comportment of the individual.

The subjects of government

This transformation in the government of economic life links to a more general mutation in arrangements for the government of conduct. New ways are taking shape for understanding, classifying and acting upon the subjects of government, entailing new relations between the ways in which people are governed by others and the ways in which they are advised to govern themselves. Fundamental to this general field is a re-coding of dividing practices, revising the distinctions between the affiliated and the marginalized. By the affiliated I mean those who are considered 'included': the individuals and families who have the financial, educational and moral means to 'pass' in their role as active citizens in responsible communities. To remain affiliated one must 'enterprise' one's life through active choice, within authoritative terms and limits that have become integrated within all the practices of everyday life, sustained by a heterogeneous array of 'civilized' images and devices for lifestyle promotion. In rearing children, in schooling, in training and employment, in ceaseless consumption, the included must calculate their actions in terms of a kind of 'investment' in themselves, in their families, and maximize this investment with reference to the codes of their own particular communities. But the marginal are those who cannot be considered affiliated to such sanctioned and civilized cultural communities. Either they are not considered as affiliated to any collectivity by virtue of their incapacity to manage themselves as subjects or they are considered affiliated to some kind of 'anti-community' whose morality, lifestyle or comportment is considered a threat or a reproach to public contentment and political order. On this division between the affiliated and the marginalized are articulated two rather different sets of debates, and two rather different governmental strategies, neither of which seem to be undertaken from 'the social point of view'.

The problem of risk provides us with a point of entry for an investigation of these novel 'post-social' strategies for governing conduct. Many have pointed to the contemporary prominence of the notion of 'risk' as a way of
understanding the troubles encountered by individuals and collectivities. Historical sociologies have suggested that the prevalence of the language of risk is a consequence of changes in the contemporary existential condition of humans and their world (Beck 1992). In contrast, genealogical studies have analysed risk as part of a particular style of thinking born during the nineteenth century (Ewald 1991). This entailed new ways of understanding and acting upon misfortune in terms of risk: risk thinking brought the future into the present and made it calculable, using the statistical intelligibility that the collective laws of large numbers seemed to provide (Hacking 1991). Most significant for present purposes have been genealogies of social insurance, that have traced the ways in which, over the course of the twentieth century, security against risk was socialized.

In the late nineteenth century, the respectable working man was urged to be prudent, an obligation which required him to take a range of active steps to secure himself, his family and his dependants against future misfortune: joining insurance schemes provided by trade associations or Friendly Societies, personal involvement in the selection of benefits and the making of regular payments and so forth (Defert 1991). These trade- or association-based schemes established rather direct connections between the individual responsibility of each member and the mutuality of the responsibility that was shared among the members as a whole. These mutualized relations of prudence were relatively short lived. By the end of the nineteenth century in Britain, Australia and the United States they were already being displaced by commercialized operations in which security was secured through individuals contracting into private insurance schemes run for profit (O'Malley 1995). At the turn of the century, in most European countries, these voluntary relations of prudence – mutual or commercial – were further transformed with the implementation of national schemes of compulsory social insurance. There were many different forces at work here, including political worries about the viability and integrity of the schemes, and concerns about the consequences to, and of, those who were left uninsured through failure of companies or through unwillingness or inability to be thrifty. But, as Ewald puts it, ‘Insurance becomes social . . . because European societies come to analyse themselves and their problems in terms of the generalised technology of risk’ (Ewald 1991): risk, responsibility and thrift became vectors of social government.

Social insurance was acquired as a benefit of citizenship. As is well known, schemes were structured with the aim that they would not ‘demoralize’ those who were their members through the inculcation of dependency, but, on the contrary, produce moral effects of responsibility, regularity of habits of labour and social obligation in those who were their beneficiaries (Gilbert 1966). Of course, the injunction to personal prudence on one’s own behalf and that of one’s dependants did not disappear over the twentieth century. But none the less, today, a strategic shift is occurring in the politics of security. Individuals are, once again, being urged by politicians and others to take upon themselves
the responsibility for their own security and that of their families: to insure against the costs of ill health through private medical insurance, to make provisions for their future through private pensions, to take an active role in securing themselves against all that could possibly threaten the security of their chosen style of life. This 'new prudentialism' (O'Malley 1992) uses the technologies of consumption – advertising, market research, niche marketing and so forth – to exacerbate anxieties about one's own future and that of one's loved ones, to encourage us to subdue these risks and to tame our fate by purchasing insurance designed especially for us and our individual situation. There is obviously an industry of risk here, seeking out and creating markets for products in the interests of its own profit. But there is also a politics of risk, as politicians warn about the future of social pension and insurance schemes, and exhort responsible individuals to take primary responsibility for the management of risks to their own security and that of their families by disposing of their current income in the interests of their own future comfort. Thus, as in other technologies of consumption, a hybrid arrangement of forces and devices has been assembled together which acts to govern choice in the supposedly mutually reinforcing interests of personal security, private profit and public good.

This contemporary prudentialism differs from its nineteenth-century forebear in a number of ways. The person who is to be made prudent is no longer mutualized but autonomized. Thrift is recast as investment in a future lifestyle of freedom. Insurantial expertise is no longer a matter of actuarial wisdom, the assurance of stability and probity, and the personal relation with the contributions collector, but works through amplifying the very anxieties against which security is to protect and promoting the dreams of tranquillity and a golden future which insurance can provide, through the use of all the techniques of advertising and marketing. Further, insurance agents now offer themselves as versatile advisers in the techniques of risk reduction and risk management. As risk is simultaneously proliferated and rendered potentially manageable, the private market for 'security' extends: not merely personal pension schemes and private health insurance, but burglar alarms, devices that monitor sleeping children, home testing kits for cholesterol levels and much more. Protection against risk through an investment in security becomes part of the responsibilities of each active individual, if they are not to feel guilt at failing to protect themselves and their loved ones against future misfortunes. The ethics of lifestyle maximization, coupled with a logic in which someone must be held to blame for any event that threatens an individual's 'quality of life', generates a relentless imperative of risk management not simply in relation to contracting for insurance, but also through daily lifestyle management, choices of where to live and shop, what to eat and drink, stress management, exercise and so forth. Of course, this inaugurates a virtually endless spiral of amplification of risk – as risk is managed in certain zones and forms of conduct (e.g. shopping in malls scanned by security cameras; foetal monitoring; low fat diets and heart
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disease), the perceived riskiness of other unprotected zones is exacerbated (high streets; unsupervised pregnancies; the uneducated dietary habits of children and the poor). These arrangements within which the individual is re-responsibilized for the management of his or her own risk produces a field characterized by uncertainty, plurality and anxiety, thus continually open to the construction of new problems and the marketing of new solutions.

These assemblages of risk are related in complex ways to the valorization of community which I discussed earlier. The exhortation to risk management can itself be organized on the territory of community, where it can have a range of diverse effects, from consumer campaigns against the use of pesticides in fruit production to ecological mobilizations against the dumping of nuclear waste: 'not in our back yard' becomes a cliché to describe these responses to threatened introduction of new risks. But this is only one version of the more valued endeavours in which individuals seek, in the name of their own community, to reduce their risk, for example, as I have mentioned, by contracting into a 'gated' community which secures itself physically and spatially against risk. These new logics of risk management are thus capable of being deployed within a wide range of strategies. They not only multiply the points at which normative calculation and intervention are required but fragment the social space of welfare into a multitude of diverse pockets, zones, folds of riskiness each comprised of a linking of specific current activities and conducts and general probabilities of their consequences. In this new configuration, 'social insurance' is no longer a key technical component for a general rationality of social solidarity: taxation for the purposes of welfare becomes, instead, the minimum price that respectable individuals and communities are prepared to pay for insuring themselves against the riskiness now seen to be concentrated within certain problematic sectors.

This discussion of risk highlights certain more general features of the new 'post-social' technologies of governing conduct which are taking shape. Under the rationalities of welfare, social technologies were to civilize individuals, render them as citizens with obligations to conduct themselves with prudence in exchange for certain guarantees against uncertainty. In the new prudential regimes, individuals, educated through the mechanisms of marketing and the pedagogies of consumption and lifestyle, are to gain access to previously 'social' benefits such as educational advantage, health status and contentment in old age through purchase in a competitive market. Promotion of private insurance by market mechanisms thus exemplifies the widespread mechanisms through which consumption and markets have become powerful new mechanisms for the shaping of conduct. These are not guided by a political logic, but they none the less make it possible to transform political technologies for the government of subjectivity. Affiliation to communities of lifestyle through the practices of consumption displaces older devices of habit formation that enjoined obligations upon citizens as part of their social responsibilities. Consider, for example, the way in which advertising and marketing have transformed the role of the technologies invented in the early
years of this century that targeted mothers – mothers-to-be in the schools, new mothers by health visitors, mothers as the guardians of hygienic and healthy homes by doctors and other experts in domesticity. Consumption regimes now operate as highly managed and carefully calibrated domains for the calculated regulation of the minutiae of private conduct through personal acts of choice. The politics of conduct at the end of the twentieth century is conducted, at least in part, through the selective amplification of passions, anxieties, allegiances and identities intrinsic to the commercial struggle to sell goods and maximize profits.

The commodification of identities and the instrumentalization of passions to which it is linked opens a heterogeneous and risky field – identities may be transgressive, identifications may lead to rave parties as much as to more salubrious lifestyles, the commodities promoted, such as alcohol or videos, may become identified with forms of conduct that themselves call forth demands for new areas of regulation. The injunction to healthy eating by politically funded programmes of health promotion is only one theme in a field that itself utilizes the opposition of wickedness to health to promote the consumption of all sorts of dangerous pleasure foods. Techniques of commodification of identities can be utilized by political authorities in calculated strategies such as those to reduce the spread of HIV, the use of drugs or the prevalence of drunken driving, but they can also be used in the spread of evangelical religions or pornography. The alliances forged here are always risky, provisional and revisable; none the less, from this point onwards, projects for the government of conduct will operate on a territory marked out by the vectors of identity, choice, consumption and lifestyle.

**Governing the margins**

It is, I think, only in relation to these logics of inclusion through choice, autonomy and consumption that one can understand the new ways that are taking shape for conceptualizing and acting upon those subjects who inhabit those zones that Beveridge termed the ‘five giants on the road of reconstruction’: Want, Disease, Ignorance, Squalor and Idleness – the five enemies that were to be attacked by ‘a comprehensive policy of social progress’ based on co-operation between the State and the individual (Beveridge 1942: 6). It would certainly be misleading to interpret the contemporary redrawing of the boundaries of the political as merely a ‘reduction of the role of the State in society’. On the one hand, we have seen the spread of the mechanisms which Deleuze characterized under the rubric of ‘societies of control’, where conduct is continually monitored and reshaped by logics immanent within all networks of practice. In such practices we are continually subject to processes of functional integration: ‘life long learning’, ‘continual retraining’, ‘constant job readiness’, ceaseless consumption (Deleuze 1995). But these processes of
continuous modulation of conduct have been accompanied by the intensification of direct, disciplinary, often coercive and carceral, political interventions in relation to particular zones and persons – the prison population is rising throughout Europe, for example. As civility is understood as affiliation by consumption, dividing practices are re-configured to problematize certain ‘abjected’ persons, sectors and locales for specific reformatory attention: the underclass, the excluded, the marginal.

It would be unwise to overstate the novelty of these divisions. One could write the history of the government of conduct in terms of its successive taxonomies and forms of division: the eighteenth-century division of poverty and pauperism; the Victorian proliferation of institutions for specific groups: fallen women, sailors out of work, blind children. At the end of the nineteenth century, there is a tension between those who would unify the social problem in terms of a degenerate constitution and those, in England most notably the Webbs, who would see the major requirement of a system of administration as a practice of distinction: the classification of socially problematic individuals into precise categories, each requiring its own distinct form of intervention. It would be foolish to deny the continued presence of these diagnostic and classificatory imperatives within the social machinery of the welfare state as it assembled over the middle decades of the twentieth century. Unlike France, where the language of social right provided a unifying milieu within which conflicting political positions could engage with one another, in England, social legislation, industrial tribunals, social security tribunals and many other apparatuses operated in terms of precise yet diverse criteria of eligibility and allowances. Nevertheless, at the programmatic level, codifiers such as Beveridge and Marshall constructed a vision in which security against hardship, like hardship itself, was social and to be provided by measures of benefit and insurance that, in name at least, were to be termed ‘universal’, including all within a unified ‘social citizenship’.

Of course, even within this unified vision there were concerns with those who eluded the bonds of citizenship – one only has to consider the debate in the 1960s over the ‘cycle of deprivation’. But the emergence of the notion of an ‘underclass’ in the United States at the end of the 1970s does seem to mark a moment in which the social vision of a continuous quantitative variability in levels of civility becomes re-coded as a qualitative distinction. ‘Behind the [ghetto’s] crumbling walls lives a large group of people who are more intractable, more socially alien and more hostile than almost anyone had imagined. . . . Their bleak environment nurtures values that are often at odds with those of the majority – even the majority of the poor. Thus the underclass produces a highly disproportionate number of the nation’s juvenile delinquents, school dropouts, drug addicts and welfare mothers, and much of the adult crime, family disruption, urban decay and demand for social expenditures’ (Time, 29 August 1977, quoted in Katz 1993: 4). The underclass was a heady mixture of long-term welfare recipients, hostile street criminals, hustlers in an alternative underground economy, traumatized alcoholics,
vagrants and de-institutionalized psychiatric patients dominating the wastelands in the decaying industrial heartland of the cities of North America. In the UK, a less lurid picture was painted, but one in which the recipients of welfare were still portrayed in terms of a moral problematization: those lured into welfare dependency by the regimes of social security themselves, those unable to accept their moral responsibilities as citizens for reasons of psychological or other personal incapacity, those who might be enterprising, but wilfully refused to operate within the values of civility and responsible self-management, such as New Age travellers or drug abusers.

Of course these essentially moral characterizations, in terms of dependency, danger or depravity, were contested by social liberals and those on the left. Initially these contestations were posed in the familiar logics of social causation and social welfare. Yet, over the last decade, within British and European rationalities of social democracy, a new style of thought has taken shape, in which the old problems of inequality and social justice are analysed in a distinctive and recurring fashion. It is suggested that secular economic changes, exacerbated by policies which have sought to reduce welfare expenditure in the name of competitive tax regimes and the like, have led to the rise of a ‘two-thirds, one-third’ society, producing a widening gap between the ‘included’ majority who are seeing their standard of living rising and impoverished minorities who are ‘excluded’ (Levitas 1996). Thus, the European Commission, in a chapter entitled ‘Social policy and protection – an active society for all’, under the heading ‘Promoting the social integration of all’, a European Commission White Paper, argues that ‘with more than 52 million people in the Union living below the poverty line, social exclusion is an endemic phenomenon . . . which threatens the social cohesion of each Member State and of the Union as a whole. . . . The marginalization of major social groups is a challenge to the social cohesion of the Union’ (European Commission 1994: 49; cf. Hutton 1995; Commission for Social Justice 1994; Joseph Rowntree Foundation 1995).

Despite their great differences in notions of economic causation and personal responsibility, these different rationalities operate with a surprisingly consonant picture of the abjected persons and groups that are their object. On the one hand, they are dispersed. They are no longer seen as part of a single group with common social characteristics, to be managed by a unified ‘social service’ and ‘generic social workers’ who can recognize the common roots of all social problems. The marginalized, the excluded, the underclass are fragmented and divided; their particular difficulties thus need to be addressed through the activities of a variety of specialists each of whom is an expert in a particular problem – training schemes for those excluded through unemployment, specialist agencies working with those with disabilities, rehabilitation of addicts undertaken by specialist drug workers, education in social skills by workers with the single homeless, specialized hostels for battered women, for alcoholics, etc. Yet, on the other hand, these abjected subjects are re-unified ethically and spatially. Ethically, in that they are accorded a new active relation
to their status in terms of their strategies and capacities for the management of themselves: they have either refused the bonds of civility and self-responsibility or they aspire to them but have not been given the skills, capacities and means. And spatially, in that the unified space of the social is re-configured, and the abjected are re-located, in both imagination and strategy, in 'marginalized' spaces: in the decaying council estate, in the chaotic lone-parent family, in the shop doorways of inner-city streets. It appears as if, outside the communities of inclusion, outside the control society, exists an array of micro-sectors, comprised of those who are unable or unwilling to enterprise their lives or manage their own risk, incapable of exercising responsible self-government, attached either to no moral community or to a community of anti-morality.

It is in this sense that it is possible to argue that new territory is emerging, after the welfare state, for the management of these micro-sectors, traced out by a plethora of quasi-autonomous agencies working within the ‘savage spaces’, in the ‘anti-communities’ on the margins, or with those abjected by virtue of their lack of competence or capacity for responsible ethical self-management: ‘voluntary’ endeavours (often run by users, survivors or philanthropists but funded by various grant regimes) – drug projects, disability organizations, self-help groups, concept houses and so forth (oppositional forces transformed into service providers). Private and for-profit organizations – old people’s homes, hostels and so forth – make their money from private insurance or from the collection of the state benefits to their individual inmates. In the huge and murky industry of ‘training’ unemployment is re-problematized as a matter of the lack of individual and marketable skills among the unemployed themselves, to be countered by a multitude of training organizations that are private and compete in a market for public contracts and public funds. Within this new territory of exclusion, the social logics of welfare bureaucracies are replaced by new logics of competition, market segmentation and service management: the management of misery and misfortune can become, once more, a potentially profitable activity.

Experts of activity

I have suggested that the contemporary politics of competence construes subjects as, actually or potentially, active elements in their own self-government. This perception extends to those whom I have termed the abjected. Whether they be construed as excluded by socio-economic forces, marginalized by virtue of personal incapacity or pathology or morally alien on account of their dependency, depravity or delinquency, their alienation is to be reversed by equipping them with certain active subjective capacities: they must take responsibility, they must show themselves capable of calculated action and choice, they must shape their lives according to a moral code of individual responsibility and community obligation. I have argued elsewhere
that in ‘control societies’, market mechanisms are increasingly utilized to link the active individual and family to expertise, and I have suggested that this opens new possibilities for questioning expertise as shown in the rise of consumers’ and users’ organizations of various sorts (Rose 1994). For those who are to be the subjects of expert attention, similar ‘active’ policies are being set in place, but this injunction to activity allows far fewer opportunities for contesting expert authority. Take the example of unemployment, which I have already discussed. In the UK, in the policies of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development and in Australia, the unemployed person is now portrayed as a ‘jobseeker’, whose ‘job readiness’ is the key point at issue, where a lapse into long-term unemployment is to be avoided by emphasizing the requirement for an ‘active’ programme of income support, and who is to be trained in the active skills of ‘job search’ (cf. Dean 1995; Walters 1994). The injunction to activity here limits the possibilities of resistance. Jobseeking conduct is to be continually subject to individualized evaluation and judgement and failure to manifest appropriately energetic conduct as specified in the manuals and criteria results in peremptory loss of benefit.

This injunction to activity extends to practices that might be thought more caring and progressive. Consider, for example, the widespread utilization of notions such as empowerment in the formulation of practices for a diversity of problematic categories (Cruikshank 1994; Baistow 1995). Experts still relate to their clients in a pedagogic and responsibilizing form. However, the emphasis has shifted. While clients were typically regarded as damaged individuals, with a personal pathology that may well have been triggered or sustained by social factors, hence requiring diagnosis and insight, the professional gaze has become more ‘superficial’: it now focuses upon conduct itself and the cognitive and moral organization of perception, intention, action and evaluation. In these new forms of practice, which are of course by no means universal but are spreading fast, the subject of expertise is now understood, at least for the purposes at hand, as an individual who lacks the cognitive, emotional, practical and ethical skills to take the personal responsibility for rational self-management. Of course, this empowerment, and the activity it is to generate, is not located within a closed disciplinary space, but upon the governable territory of cultural community. Empowerment, then, is a matter of experts teaching, coaxing, requiring their clients to conduct themselves within particular cultural communities of ethics and lifestyle, according to certain specified arts of active personal responsibility. Empowerment, with all its emphasis on strengthening the capacity of the individual to play the role of actor in his or her own life, has come to encompass a range of interventions to transmit, under tutelage, certain professionally ratified mental, ethical and practical techniques for active self-management. Under the sign of empowerment, one thus can observe the re-deployment of the whole panoply of psychological technologies for reforming conduct in relation to particular norms, from individual psychotherapy in various rational and cognitive forms, through the use of programmed behavioural techniques to group work. In line
with the ‘superficial’ gaze of the new experts of conduct, however, these techniques are re-conceptualized so that they can be seen as having visible, identifiable and specifiable behavioural or mental outputs, leading to target behaviours that seem to be amenable to measurement and calculation. And, as we shall see, this emphasis on goals, targets and measurements is part of a new way not only of managing profession-client relations, but of managing professionals themselves.

Risk, community and expertise

The notion of risk once more provides a useful point of entry into the revised relations of expertise taking shape on the territory of community. In part this is because the capacity for personal ‘power’, or the lack of it, which is the object of empowerment technologies is itself re-thought in terms of the relations of risk and community which I discussed earlier: the risks posed to the individual themselves if they cannot adequately manage their life within the community, the risks the individual may pose to the community on account of their failure to govern themselves. It is also because the responsibilities of experts are themselves being re-formulated in terms of risk and community. In a range of domains, social workers, psychiatrists, doctors and others have been allocated accountability not so much for the cure or reform of clients, patients and other problematic individuals, but for their administration according to a logic of risk minimization (cf. Castel 1991; Rose 1996a). The novel intellectual techniques of risk identification, risk assessment and risk management bring into existence a whole new set of professional obligations – the obligation that each individual professional should calculate and reduce the risk of their professional conduct, instruct the subjects of their authority in the riskiness of the practices and procedures in which they are engaged and manage their clients in the light of the imperative to reduce the risk they may pose to others – their children, members of ‘the general public’. Experts are thus increasingly required to undertake not so much an identification of a condition but a calculation of the riskiness of an individual or an event, with the obligation to take (legal, moral, professional, financial) responsibility for the calculations that they make, the advice that they give and the success of the strategies that they put into place to monitor and manage that risk. This is only one of the ways in which the re-configuring of the territory of government has been linked to new roles for experts in the government of the conduct of active individuals within their communities.

Social government was expert government. The devices of ‘the welfare state’ opened a multitude of new locales for the operation of expert judgements, based on knowledge, training, professional and bureaucratic ethics and specialist skills: bureaus of various types, benefit, social security and unemployment offices, dossiers, case records, case conferences and tribunals. In each of these locales, experts and their judgements were not only
vital relays in the links between political objectives and personal conduct, they also had considerable capacities to 'enclose' themselves and their judgements, to make demands in terms of their own perceptions of their interests and the requirements of the apparatuses they operated — in short to deploy a range of tactics to render themselves difficult for politicians to govern, if not actually 'ungovernable'. While the problems posed by experts were bemoaned over many years and from many different perspectives, a number of new technologies are currently being deployed through which experts can be linked into the devices for the conduct of conduct. Locales and activities that were previously part of the assemblages of the 'social' are being autonomized from the machinery of politics and novel devices are being used to govern the activities of those who work within them. In a plethora of quasi-autonomous units, associations and 'intermediate organizations', experts are allocated new responsibilities and new mechanisms are developed for the management of professional expertise 'at a distance' — that is, outside the machinery of bureaucracy that previously bound experts into devices for the government of 'the social'. Previously 'social' experts such as social workers, benefit officers, doctors, social service bureaucrats and others now operate within a whole variety of quasi-private regulatory organizations: in the UK situation one could point to the Next Steps Initiative in the fragmentation and contractualization of the Civil Service; the establishment of 'agencies' to run even apparatuses previously considered to be essential to 'the State' such as the prison service; the proliferation of such hybrid public/private entities as Training and Enterprise Boards; the purchaser-provider split and case management techniques in social services, the fragmentation of health services into autonomous trusts and a range of other shifts popularly termed 'the quango-ization of the State'.

Three aspects are worth highlighting.

First, in the UK situation at least, there is a renewed emphasis upon the potential of a variety of legal and quasi-legal mechanisms to meet political obligations to address 'problems' — from discharged psychiatric patients to insider dealing — while refusing an extension of the politico-administrative machinery of the State. I am thinking here of the use of such statutorily specified and legally enforceable criteria as those governing minimum service standards and contracts specifying performance targets and outputs — numbers of patients to be treated, length of time a case must wait until dealt with, obligations for the relations between case managers, their clients and the providing organization and so forth. This should not be seen as the expansion of 'law' as a 'system' and its capture by a political apparatus. The mechanisms of legal regulation are complex and fragmented. Politicians, professionals and consumer groups organize around the production of codes of professional conduct which specify various rights for users and clients. A new 'litigious mentality' ensures that 'the shadow of the law' becomes a means of managing professional activity through the self-regulation of decisions and actions in relation to such formally promulgated codes and standards. Struggles over the regulation of expertise occur not only in the courts, but in campus sexual
harassment offices, human rights committees and commissions, review bodies for appealing welfare decisions and in many new and diverse forums. These legal procedures are not in themselves new. None the less, the widespread utilization of these forms of regulation renders the actions and judgements of professionals governable in new ways – and, in the process, changes the very terms in which these judgements themselves are construed, prioritized, justified and enacted.

Perhaps even more significant has been the spreading of modes of financial calculation and budgetary obligations to areas which were previously governed according to bureaucratic, professional or other norms. The allocation of budgetary responsibilities to professionals – doctors, educationalists, civil servants, those working with excluded groups – requires them to calculate their actions not in the esoteric languages of their own expertise but by translating them into costs and benefits that can be given an accounting value. Coupled with the raft of other elements sometimes referred to as ‘the new public management’, this has transformed the governability of professional activity while, at the same time, apparently devolving more decisional power to those actually involved in devising and delivering services in local sites (cf. Hood 1991). Again, on the one hand, this has punctured the enclosures within which many forms of expertise were able to insulate themselves from ‘political interference’. On the other, it has done so at the price of shifting powers to other forms of expertise – those of accountants and managers – and of changing the very terms in which experts calculate and enact their expertise.

Finally, it is worth remarking upon the ways in which the mechanisms of audit have become versatile ways of purporting to render accountable and judgeable the activity of professionals, managers, businessmen, politicians and many others (Power 1994). Audits of various sorts come to replace the trust that social government invested in professional wisdom and the decisions and actions of specialists. In a whole variety of practices – educational, medical, economic, organizational – audits hold out the promise – however specious – of new distantiated forms of control between political centres of decision and the autonomized loci – schools, hospitals, firms – who now have the responsibility for the government of health, wealth and happiness. Like the utilization of legal codes, and the allocation of budgetary responsibilities, government by audit transforms that which is to be governed: rendering something auditable shapes the processes that are to be audited, and the logics and technical requirements of audit displace the internal logics of expertise. Thus the emphasis on defined and measurable goals and targets in the work that professionals do with their abjected clients is an element within a much wider re-configuration of methods for the government of specialist activities. These arrangements retain the formal independence of the professional while utilizing new techniques of accountability to render their decisions visible, calculable and amenable to evaluation. No doubt many different factors converged to accord political priority to attempts to open up expertise to
visibility and judgement according to criteria that purport to be publicly intelligible, rather than logics that are the esoteric preserve of the specialists themselves. And no doubt the consequences have frequently been costly and bureaucratic. But a politics of expertise also needs to recognize that such mechanisms may perhaps contain some innovative possibilities for contesting and reshaping the relations of power between experts and their subjects.

Conclusions

Many of the transformations to which I have drawn attention are themselves linked to a shift within the field of politics itself, in the ways in which political discourse itself configures the limits of the political and its relations with other domains. Confronted by supra-national associations and trans-national ecological movements, rival nationalisms fighting across a single geographical terrain, federalism, the politics of ethnic, cultural and linguistic minorities, and multi-culturalism, it is no longer easy for political thought to territorialize itself in an apparently 'natural' geo-political space in which the nation is co-extensive with and delimited by a unified polity of social citizens (cf. Tully 1995). In the face of such 'strange multiplicities', to adopt Tully's term, in a variety of national contexts and from a variety of political positions, 'anti-political motifs' are on the rise within political discourse (Hindess 1994a). These motifs not only stress the corruption and ineffectiveness of the political classes but, more fundamentally, are based upon a sense of the limits of any politics that sees itself as omni-competent and articulates itself in terms of overarching political programmes. These 'anti-political' motifs have recently alighted upon 'community' – which in recent years had been a part of the mundane vocabulary of social policy and sociological investigation, valorized only by a small band of communitarian political philosophers and romantic or eccentric activists – as the space in which powers and responsibilities previously allocated to politicians might be relocated. Each of these emergent political rationalities – civic republicanism, associationalism, communitarian liberalism – in its different way, seeks a way of governing, not through the politically directed, nationally territorialized, bureaucratically staffed and programmatically rationalized projects of a centrally concentrated State, but through instrumentalizing the self-governing properties of the subjects of government themselves in a whole variety of locales and localities – enterprises, associations, neighbourhoods, interest groups and, of course, communities. Of course, it would be absurd to suggest that a politics of community is itself novel: as Tully points out, communitarianism may be regarded as one of the traditional themes of modern constitutional thought (along with nationalism and liberalism). But in these contemporary political rationalities, community is made calculable by a whole variety of reports, investigations and statistical enquiries, is the premise and objective of a range of governmental technologies and is to be acted upon in a multitude of
authoritative practices and professional encounters. Community, that is to say, is to be governmentalized: it cannot be understood outside the other shifts to which I have tried to draw attention in this paper. What are of interest, therefore, are the problematizations through which collective existence has come to offer itself to thought in the form of community, and the new representations, techniques, powers and ethical relations that have been invented in the process.

It is too early to gauge the durability of these new ways of thinking about politics and government. For present purposes, their significance lies less in their success than in the evidence that they provide of an imperative felt at the heart of politics to fashion a revised way of governing, one which can, not only make itself consistent with the heterogeneity of the forms in which struggles are now carried out – nationalist, ethnic, religious, moral, environmental – but also connect up with the new conceptions of subjectivity through which the subjects of government increasingly have come to understand and relate to themselves. It is, of course, not a question of the replacement of ‘the social’ by ‘the community’: the spatialization and territorialization of political thought does not proceed in such linear sequences. None the less, the hold of ‘the social’ over our political imagination is weakening. While the social has no doubt been seen as a zone of failure since its birth, the solution to these failures is no longer automatically seen to be reinvention of the social. While our political, professional, moral and cultural authorities still speak happily of ‘society’, the very meaning and ethical salience of this term is under question as ‘society’ is perceived as dissociated into a variety of ethical and cultural communities with incompatible allegiances and incommensurable obligations.

We have still to begin the task of anatomizing the new relations of power brought into play on this new multiple and fragmented territory of government. In doing so, we should not assume that all is for the worst in this ‘post-social’ age. We need not simply to condemn the injustices and disadvantages entailed in the de-socialization of government, but also to engage inventively with the possibilities opened up by the imperatives of activity and the images of plural affinities. The role of such analyses should not be to praise or to blame, but to diagnose, to identify the points of weakness that might be exploited if we are to maximize the capacity of individuals and collectivities to shape the knowledges, contest the authorities and configure the practices that will govern them in the name of their freedoms and commitments.

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Notes

1 This paper originated in comments prepared for a workshop on Radically Rethinking Regulation at Centre of Criminology, University of Toronto, 16–17 April 1994. A version was also given at a conference to mark the tenth anniversary of the
death of Michel Foucault held in London on 25 June 1994. My argument was intended to be open and speculative, and I have chosen to retain this in the written version. Barry Hindess helped me understand contemporary transformations in the government of 'the economy', but he is not responsible for my interpretation of his work. Thanks also to Mariana Valverde for perceptive criticisms of an earlier draft, to Clifford Shearing for insightful reader's comments, to Pat O'Malley for stimulating conversations on these topics and to Stephen Mugford for productive disagreements. The final version of the paper was prepared while I was a Visiting Research Fellow in the Political Science Program of the Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, and I would like to thank that institution for its support and hospitality. Comments from members of the History of the Present Research Network, especially Larry Barth, David Owen, Michael Power, Anne-Marie Singh and Grahame Thompson, helped me make some last minute revisions.

2 I take this phrase from Procacci (1989) but use it slightly differently.
3 On lines, see especially the discussion in Deleuze and Parnet (1987: 124–47).
4 Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson have recently argued forcefully that the analysts and commentators have got it wrong, that economic relations were, in many ways, more 'globalized' in previous times than they are today, and that it is misleading and pernicious to argue that national governments are powerless (Hirst and Thompson 1996). For the purposes of my argument however, the truth effects of discourses of economic globalization are somewhat independent of the veracity of the analysis.
5 Obviously there are similarities between this argument and that concerning the construction of nations and identities in the form of 'imagined communities', which cannot be discussed here (cf. Anderson 1991).
6 In an article in the Guardian newspaper of 29 January 1996, timed to coincide with a speech to mark the tenth anniversary of the report of the Archbishop of Canterbury's Special Commission on Urban Priority areas, Faith in the City.
7 The term 'diaspora' which is sometimes employed here is interesting, implying that what is currently dispersed was once together -- an essential unity scattered by the hand of fate or politics.
8 There are, of course, many other versions of this, most notably in the revival of civic republicanism. The 'advanced liberal' ethos of much contemporary civic republicanism is pointed out in Burchell (1995).
9 Quango is an acronym for Quasi-Autonomous Non-Governmental Organization.

References

The death of the social?


